all:
  children:
    zuul_unreachable:
      hosts: {}
  hosts:
    debian-bookworm:
      ansible_connection: ssh
      ansible_host: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fea7:8697
      ansible_port: 22
      ansible_python_interpreter: auto
      ansible_user: zuul
      nodepool:
        az: nova
        cloud: regiocloud-a-ci
        external_id: 6b980ea7-089a-4c50-8a62-e1f27807a310
        host_id: 82101243836454d7401d5893feae9e2c5df7cc291646d8a99b33b53b
        interface_ip: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fea7:8697
        label: debian-bookworm
        node_properties: {}
        private_ipv4: 10.128.0.110
        private_ipv6: null
        provider: regiocloud-a
        public_ipv4: 81.163.192.221
        public_ipv6: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fea7:8697
        region: null
        slot: null
  vars:
    zuul:
      _inheritance_path:
      - '<Job base explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/zuul-config/zuul.d/jobs.yaml@main#2>'
      - '<Job python-black explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/zuul-jobs/.zuul.yaml@main#54>'
      - '<Job python-black explicit: None implied: None source: osism/release/.zuul.yaml@main#14>'
      ansible_version: '9'
      attempts: 1
      branch: main
      build: 8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5
      build_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '2625'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency gitpython to v3.1.54 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.54` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.54?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.54?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist
          omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/release).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/release/pull/2625
        commit_id: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        patchset: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/release
          name: osism/release
          short_name: release
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/release
        topic: null
      buildset: 113dc75da105424bb2a4d2d263364b02
      buildset_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '2625'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency gitpython to v3.1.54 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.54` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.54?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.54?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist
          omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/release).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/release/pull/2625
        commit_id: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        patchset: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/release
          name: osism/release
          short_name: release
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/release
        topic: null
      change: '2625'
      change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency gitpython to v3.1.54 [security]\n\nThis
        PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
        | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
        [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) |
        `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.54` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.54?slim=true)
        | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.54?slim=true)
        |\n\n---\n\n### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits
        --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
        denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
        into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
        so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
        execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
        Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
        \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
        `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
        `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
        do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
        Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
        an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
        second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
        or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
        Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
        +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
        post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
        Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard:
        n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
        Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
        Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
        `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout`
        at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).\n\n#####
        Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']`
        passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`,
        creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template`
        is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not
        covered by any existing advisory.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
        Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing
        options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
        \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10
        (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
        in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()` forwards
        `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
        guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
        giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
        to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n##### Root
        Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
        anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does `args.insert(0,
        other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE the `--` separator,
        so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an option \u2014 a value-only
        control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n##### Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any
        file at process privilege with attacker-chosen path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
        configs, lockfiles). Content is real diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced).
        Per the skill's rule, controlling WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless
        of content constraints.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
        output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
        (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the ref
        string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')          #
        14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1.
        Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)` with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`.
        Guard: none in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in
        the method body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink:
        `git diff-tree <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git
        opens+truncates the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt
        any file at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and
        victim overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag
        3.1.53): both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
        overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
        This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
        \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
        Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
        to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
        before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
        by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
        Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
        token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
        guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since)
        can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`,
        `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token
        inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`
        configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n#####
        Root Cause\nThe guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only:
        `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']`
        (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n`
        is not on the denylist, so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n',
        value, split_single_char_options=True)` (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv
        tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`. git then parses the second token as
        `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never
        inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
        OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) in the default
        configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates
        through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom
        git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch
        /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name
        form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write variant on
        a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')` ->
        candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file truncated.\n\n#####
        Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url,
        path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([],
        kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)` at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([],
        {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})` -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist ->
        no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n',
        value, split_single_char_options=True)` -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`.
        Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified
        transform emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
        -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
        created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
        HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
        `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from with
        the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=` form raised
        UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96
        long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split)
        are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token
        vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake
        `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg
        VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect, OR run `check_unsafe_options`
        over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate
        list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
        [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
        - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
        What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
        Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
        At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
        defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
        manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
        conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
        Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
        - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
        box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
        View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/release).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
      change_url: https://github.com/osism/release/pull/2625
      child_jobs: []
      commit_id: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
      event_id: 1cb1cb00-87aa-11f1-85b3-e95920262be3
      executor:
        hostname: 521e9411259a
        inventory_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5/ansible/inventory.yaml
        log_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5/work/logs
        result_data_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5/work/results.json
        src_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5/work/src
        work_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/8f9e91e00f294028b00ac29c945339e5/work
      include_vars: []
      items:
      - branch: main
        change: '2625'
        change_message: "chore(deps): update dependency gitpython to v3.1.54 [security]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.54` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.54?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.54?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist
          omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/release).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/release/pull/2625
        commit_id: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        patchset: 0e02ffbec896bbc1029bd054681ad3acda6af8c2
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/release
          name: osism/release
          short_name: release
          src_dir: src/github.com/osism/release
        topic: null
      job: python-black
      jobtags: []
      max_attempts: 3
      message: chore(deps): update dependency gitpython to v3.1.54 [security]

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) | `==3.1.53` → `==3.1.54` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.54?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.54?slim=true) |

---

### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks
[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.

##### Root Cause
`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

##### Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

##### Proof of Concept
```python

##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate `['--template']`, no error).
3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Add `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)
[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
`Diffable.diff()` forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options` guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`, giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.

##### Root Cause
`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options` anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an option — a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.

##### Impact
Overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.

##### Proof of Concept
```python

##### Key-control:
commit.diff(other_commit, output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff (105 bytes verified)

##### Value-control (attacker controls only the ref string):
commit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')          # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)` with `other = "--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys"`. Guard: none in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.
2. Sink: `git diff-tree <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim overwrite live.

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`) overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`. This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')` — but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Add `check_unsafe_options` to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options` before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution
[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython's `check_unsafe_options` guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`.

##### Root Cause
The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist, so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)` (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`. git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.

##### Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.

##### Proof of Concept
```python
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")

##### /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.
```
File-write variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')` -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file truncated.

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)` at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."})` -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).
2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)` -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens.
3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`; `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=` form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Make `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect, OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>

### [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54): - SECURITY

[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)

#### What's Changed

- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)

**Full Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>

</details>

---

### Configuration

📅 **Schedule**: (UTC)

- Branch creation
  - At any time (no schedule defined)
- Automerge
  - At any time (no schedule defined)

🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

 - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

---

This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/release).
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