all:
  children:
    zuul_unreachable:
      hosts: {}
  hosts:
    debian-bookworm:
      ansible_connection: ssh
      ansible_host: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fedd:665e
      ansible_port: 22
      ansible_python_interpreter: auto
      ansible_user: zuul
      nodepool:
        az: nova
        cloud: regiocloud-a-ci
        external_id: 28e459d8-feb6-4488-a565-cbb9be9a6831
        host_id: 4ba4344415ca7057d9956ea5de826bbc0b830981e82c0e0f191fa07b
        interface_ip: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fedd:665e
        label: debian-bookworm
        node_properties: {}
        private_ipv4: 10.128.7.211
        private_ipv6: null
        provider: regiocloud-a
        public_ipv4: 81.163.193.82
        public_ipv6: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fedd:665e
        region: null
        slot: null
  vars:
    zuul:
      _inheritance_path:
      - '<Job base explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/zuul-config/zuul.d/jobs.yaml@main#2>'
      - '<Job yamllint explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/zuul-jobs/.zuul.yaml@main#59>'
      - '<Job yamllint explicit: None implied: None source: osism/netbox-manager/.zuul.yaml@main#39>'
      ansible_version: '9'
      attempts: 1
      branch: main
      build: 5326e7f89e834d2a97704f1e4c44d7ca
      build_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '293'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.58 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.57` \u2192 `==3.1.58` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.58?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.57/3.1.58?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree
          enables arbitrary file overwrite\n[GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`,
          `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced
          treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard,
          no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree
          --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path,
          and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the
          method's internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid
          git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251`
          (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree`
          was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites
          in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n##### Root
          Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree),
          and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)`
          with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced
          and positional.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction
          at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index
          blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled
          \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen
          writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\"
          rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n\n#####
          target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)`
          / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2.
          Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never
          call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014
          no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/\u2026/victim']`
          (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index
          blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently
          reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')`
          \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts
          `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob).
          `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit
          read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched
          on HEAD.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`,
          and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block
          `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.\n\n---\nReported by
          **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary
          command execution via --template clone hooks\n[GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Repo.init()` forwards
          `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options`
          parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new
          repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a
          hook that executes on the next git operation \u2192 arbitrary code execution.
          `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`,
          and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct
          method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare
          `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options`
          and no `allow_unsafe_options`.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary code execution
          (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions
          raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg
          (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at
          a known path \u2014 the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH
          for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because
          `Repo.init` has no guard at all.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n#####
          attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.init(path,
          template=\"/evil\")\n\n##### next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit ->
          ACE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit`
          (executable) and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template='/evil')`.\n2.
          Check: NONE on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`.
          argv (observed): `['git','init','--template=/evil']`.\n3. Sink: git copies
          `/evil/hooks/post-commit` \u2192 `<repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit`.\n4. Impact:
          next commit runs the hook \u2192 arbitrary code execution.\n\n##### Bypass
          Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>')`
          \u2192 argv `['git','init','--template=<evil>']` unguarded; hook copied
          into `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker
          was created. `--separate-git-dir=<path>` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect
          vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).\n\n##### Affected
          Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting
          a denylist that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking
          / hook-installing options).\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub:
          @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector
          String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove()
          and Head.checkout()\n[GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`IndexFile.remove()`
          and `Head.checkout()` forward `**kwargs` into `git rm` and `git checkout`\nwith
          no guard. Passing `--pathspec-from-file=<file>` **together with `--pathspec-file-nul`**\nmakes
          Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec\nerror
          quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through `GitCommandError.stderr`,
          so the\nentire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller
          in band.\n\nThis is the same primitive as Instance 2 of\n[GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f)
          - `TagReference.create()`\nwith `-F`, arbitrary file read returned in band
          - at two sites that advisory assessed and\ncleared.\n\n##### Prior art,
          and why I am filing rather than commenting\n\nGHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep
          table lists these four sites with the assessment\n*\"`--pathspec-from-file`
          only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found\"*:\n\n| Call
          site | git command | that advisory's assessment |\n|---|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.remove()`
          | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure
          primitive found |\n| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |\n| `HEAD.reset()`
          | `reset` | same |\n| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |\n\nThat assessment
          is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with\n`--pathspec-from-file`
          alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the **first\nline**,
          which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding `--pathspec-file-nul` -
          a sibling flag\nof the same option, and the documented way to handle paths
          containing newlines - makes the\nwhole file one pathspec.\n\n##### Root
          cause\n\n`git/index/base.py:991-1043`:\n\n```python\ndef remove(self, items,
          working_tree=False, **kwargs):\n    ...\n    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args,
          paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043\n```\n\n`git/refs/head.py:237-268`:\n\n```python\ndef
          checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):\n    ...\n    self.repo.git.checkout(self,
          **kwargs)                                 # line 268\n```\n\nNeither has
          an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter or a `check_unsafe_options()` call.\n\n#####
          Proof of concept\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import
          GitCommandError\n\nrepo = Repo(\"/path/to/repo\")\nkw = dict(pathspec_from_file=\"/etc/passwd\",
          pathspec_file_nul=True)\n\ntry:\n    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          #
          or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)\nexcept GitCommandError as e:\n    print(e.stderr)
          \                     # <- entire file contents\n```\n\nObserved on published
          3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:\n\n```\n[PASS]
          IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr:
          'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n       LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n
          \      ' did not match any files'\n[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout`
          returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n
          \      LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n       ' did not match
          any file(s) known to git'\n[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not
          every unguarded site discloses\n[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index
          leaks 0/3\n```\n\nThe two precision controls are there so the result is
          about these sinks and not about the\ncanary being visible everywhere.\n\n#####
          Scope correction to the table above\n\nOf the four sites cleared with that
          sentence, **two disclose and two do not**:\n\n| Call site | disclosed? |\n|---|---|\n|
          `IndexFile.remove()` \u2192 `git rm` | **yes, full file** |\n| `Head.checkout()`
          \u2192 `git checkout` | **yes, full file** |\n| `HEAD.reset()` \u2192 `git
          reset` | no - `git reset` does not error on unmatched pathspecs |\n| `IndexFile.move()`
          \u2192 `git mv` | no |\n\nThe two negatives are mentioned because \"the
          dismissal was wrong\" would overstate it: the\ndismissal was wrong for half
          of what it covered.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via
          Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython\n[GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython computes
          the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`)
          from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because
          that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a
          malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g.
          `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and
          initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside
          the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones
          the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization
          (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common
          and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack
          class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never
          adopted an equivalent check.\n\n##### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py`
          `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules`
          `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()`
          in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)`
          and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never
          used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()`
          then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join`
          does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this
          value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`,
          creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config)
          at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository
          the victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n##### PoC\n1. Environment:
          Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get
          install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory
          as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`,
          but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image).
          GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython`
          from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to
          the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration
          / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the
          attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules`
          + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3.
          Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's \"Confirmed test run\"
          section):\n```bash\n$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc
          .\n$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker
          run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`,
          then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source
          of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001
          PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent
          of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git\nrepository
          was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport shutil\n\nimport
          git\n\nCLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'\nESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'\n\ndef
          main():\n    shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)\n
          \   shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR),
          exist_ok=True)\n\n    print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')\n    repo
          = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)\n    print('Cloned
          into:', repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n    sms = list(repo.submodules)\n    for
          sm in sms:\n        print('  submodule name:', repr(sm.name))\n        print('
          \ submodule path:', repr(sm.path))\n\n    print('escape_target exists before
          update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    for sm in sms:\n        try:\n
          \           sm.update(init=True)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print('sm.update
          raised:', repr(e))\n\n    exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n    print('escape_target
          exists after update:', exists)\n    if exists:\n        print('escape_target
          contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE'
          if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    main()\n```\n5.
          Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's \"Confirmed
          test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC
          (vulnerable path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n
          \ submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'\n
          \ submodule path: 'legit_dir'\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target
          exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: ['modules_dir']\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n===
          Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious
          submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning:
          ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal:
          No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE
          (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the
          `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule
          \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]` (built
          by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The
          malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in
          the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the
          on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory.\n7. Expected
          vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI
          control run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule
          name\" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython
          instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git
          repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by
          `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8. Security
          impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation
          at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone
          directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's
          own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n##### Impact\nPath traversal (CWE-22)
          / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory
          and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity
          impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule
          URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only
          creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion
          potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control
          a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine,
          often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management
          tooling.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String:
          `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n#### References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses
          name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)\n[GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's config-name
          validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `\"option\"` label; it does
          not reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**.
          `write_section` writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so
          an option name such as `sshCommand = touch <cmd> #` is written as `\\tsshCommand
          = touch <cmd> # = <value>`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch
          <cmd>` (the trailing `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary
          config directives (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) \u2192
          RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not
          section name) and distinct character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket)
          from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w
          / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_assure_config_name_safe(name,
          label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY
          when `label == \"section\"`; for the `\"option\"` label it falls through
          with just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\\r\\n\\x00]` regex. `write_section`
          then writes the option name verbatim into `\"\\t%s = %s\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary git-config directive injection \u2192 remote code execution
          via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed)
          or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application
          to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control
          model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories
          GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nwith repo.config_writer() as cw:\n    cw.set_value(\"core\",
          \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")\n\n##### git config --get core.sshCommand
          \ ->  touch /tmp/RCE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls config
          writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand
          = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")`.\n2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option,
          \"option\")` @&#8203; config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\\r\\n\\x00]`;
          bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label==\"section\"`. Bypass proof:
          `=`,`#`,space pass \u2192 no `ValueError`.\n3. Sink: `write_section` writes
          `\"\\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n4. Impact:
          git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` \u2192 arbitrary code execution
          on next git op.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate
          harness): `set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x')` \u2192 no
          `ValueError`; file line `sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x`; `git config --get
          core.sshCommand` \u2192 `touch <RCE>` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath`
          via both `GitConfigParser` and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read:
          bracket/quote checks are inside `if label == \"section\"`; the `\"option\"`
          label is not covered.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57`
          (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested
          Fix\nApply the section-name safety checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`,
          whitespace) to the `\"option\"` label as well, or validate the fully-rendered
          config line after substitution.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014
          GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False
          short-option token smuggling enables command execution\n[GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nThe `check_unsafe_options`
          guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push,
          ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character
          kwarg with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list
          omits the smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>`
          argv token that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary
          command execution at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an
          incomplete-fix bypass of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3),
          which only emits value-derived candidates when `split_single_char_options`
          is True.\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_option_candidates` derives value-token candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` (cmd.py:1048,
          added by `e8d0fbf7`). With `split_single_char_options=False`, `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack\"})` returns only `['-n']` (not on
          the denylist), so the guard passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=False)`
          emits the JOINED token `-nutouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack` (cmd.py:1631). git
          clusters value-less short flags then parses `-u<cmd>` = `--upload-pack=<cmd>`
          \u2192 command execution. The hardened guard WOULD block the joined token
          if it saw it \u2014 the flaw is it never receives it.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
          OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) at default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`, affecting all guarded methods that forward
          kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards a user-controlled kwargs dict containing
          `split_single_char_options=False` plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding
          model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 accepts).\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom
          git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst,\n    n=\"utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\",\n
          \   split_single_char_options=False)   # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards user kwargs to `Repo.clone_from(url,
          path, **kwargs)`: `{split_single_char_options: False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}`.\n2.
          Check: `check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Guard: denylist includes `--upload-pack`/`-u`. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates`
          yields only `['-n']` (value token skipped because `split=False`); guard
          never sees `-u`.\n3. Sink: `transform_kwarg` emits joined token (cmd.py:1631).
          argv (observed): `['git','clone','-v','-nutouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>']`.\n4.
          Impact: git clusters `-n` + `-u<cmd>` \u2192 runs upload-pack command \u2192
          ACE.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness, default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`): the `split=False` payload created the marker
          `VH05_GATE_ACE` (ACE); the clone returned normally (guard bypassed). Control:
          `n='--upload-pack=\u2026'` (split default True) \u2192 `UnsafeOptionError:
          --upload-pack is not allowed`. Fix-commit read: `e8d0fbf7` extends candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` \u2014 split=False
          skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse fix (commit
          `56806080`) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives `['-n']`.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (code present verbatim on the latest
          release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` emit value-derived
          candidates regardless of `split_single_char_options` (i.e. also for the
          joined `-n<value>` form), OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed
          argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.58`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58):
          Security and Fixes\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58)\n\n#####
          What's Changed\n\n- test: allow Python startup before timeout by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2195](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2195)\n-
          Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2199](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2199)\n-
          Revert \"Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH\" by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2200](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2200)\n-
          test: focus pytest summary on unexpected failures by [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          Validate submodule names before filesystem operations by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          Handle invalid submodule names during recursive updates by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2205](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2205)\n-
          Fix Windows path handling on Python 3.13+ by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2196](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2196)\n-
          fixup 2202 by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2206](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2206)\n-
          Correct Windows hook Bash precedence by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2201](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2201)\n-
          Harden config and Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          Skip tests that need symlink privileges instead of erroring by [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529)
          in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n#####
          New Contributors\n\n- [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) made their
          first contribution in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMTIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsicmVub3ZhdGUiXX0=-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/293
        commit_id: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        patchset: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      buildset: f4e34c3552874ac1acc88cff999b53d8
      buildset_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '293'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.58 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.57` \u2192 `==3.1.58` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.58?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.57/3.1.58?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree
          enables arbitrary file overwrite\n[GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`,
          `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced
          treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard,
          no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree
          --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path,
          and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the
          method's internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid
          git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251`
          (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree`
          was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites
          in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n##### Root
          Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree),
          and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)`
          with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced
          and positional.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction
          at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index
          blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled
          \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen
          writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\"
          rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n\n#####
          target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)`
          / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2.
          Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never
          call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014
          no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/\u2026/victim']`
          (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index
          blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently
          reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')`
          \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts
          `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob).
          `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit
          read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched
          on HEAD.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`,
          and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block
          `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.\n\n---\nReported by
          **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary
          command execution via --template clone hooks\n[GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Repo.init()` forwards
          `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options`
          parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new
          repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a
          hook that executes on the next git operation \u2192 arbitrary code execution.
          `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`,
          and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct
          method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare
          `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options`
          and no `allow_unsafe_options`.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary code execution
          (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions
          raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg
          (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at
          a known path \u2014 the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH
          for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because
          `Repo.init` has no guard at all.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n#####
          attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.init(path,
          template=\"/evil\")\n\n##### next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit ->
          ACE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit`
          (executable) and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template='/evil')`.\n2.
          Check: NONE on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`.
          argv (observed): `['git','init','--template=/evil']`.\n3. Sink: git copies
          `/evil/hooks/post-commit` \u2192 `<repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit`.\n4. Impact:
          next commit runs the hook \u2192 arbitrary code execution.\n\n##### Bypass
          Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>')`
          \u2192 argv `['git','init','--template=<evil>']` unguarded; hook copied
          into `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker
          was created. `--separate-git-dir=<path>` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect
          vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).\n\n##### Affected
          Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting
          a denylist that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking
          / hook-installing options).\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub:
          @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector
          String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove()
          and Head.checkout()\n[GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`IndexFile.remove()`
          and `Head.checkout()` forward `**kwargs` into `git rm` and `git checkout`\nwith
          no guard. Passing `--pathspec-from-file=<file>` **together with `--pathspec-file-nul`**\nmakes
          Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec\nerror
          quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through `GitCommandError.stderr`,
          so the\nentire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller
          in band.\n\nThis is the same primitive as Instance 2 of\n[GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f)
          - `TagReference.create()`\nwith `-F`, arbitrary file read returned in band
          - at two sites that advisory assessed and\ncleared.\n\n##### Prior art,
          and why I am filing rather than commenting\n\nGHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep
          table lists these four sites with the assessment\n*\"`--pathspec-from-file`
          only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found\"*:\n\n| Call
          site | git command | that advisory's assessment |\n|---|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.remove()`
          | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure
          primitive found |\n| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |\n| `HEAD.reset()`
          | `reset` | same |\n| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |\n\nThat assessment
          is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with\n`--pathspec-from-file`
          alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the **first\nline**,
          which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding `--pathspec-file-nul` -
          a sibling flag\nof the same option, and the documented way to handle paths
          containing newlines - makes the\nwhole file one pathspec.\n\n##### Root
          cause\n\n`git/index/base.py:991-1043`:\n\n```python\ndef remove(self, items,
          working_tree=False, **kwargs):\n    ...\n    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args,
          paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043\n```\n\n`git/refs/head.py:237-268`:\n\n```python\ndef
          checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):\n    ...\n    self.repo.git.checkout(self,
          **kwargs)                                 # line 268\n```\n\nNeither has
          an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter or a `check_unsafe_options()` call.\n\n#####
          Proof of concept\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import
          GitCommandError\n\nrepo = Repo(\"/path/to/repo\")\nkw = dict(pathspec_from_file=\"/etc/passwd\",
          pathspec_file_nul=True)\n\ntry:\n    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          #
          or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)\nexcept GitCommandError as e:\n    print(e.stderr)
          \                     # <- entire file contents\n```\n\nObserved on published
          3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:\n\n```\n[PASS]
          IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr:
          'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n       LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n
          \      ' did not match any files'\n[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout`
          returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n
          \      LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n       ' did not match
          any file(s) known to git'\n[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not
          every unguarded site discloses\n[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index
          leaks 0/3\n```\n\nThe two precision controls are there so the result is
          about these sinks and not about the\ncanary being visible everywhere.\n\n#####
          Scope correction to the table above\n\nOf the four sites cleared with that
          sentence, **two disclose and two do not**:\n\n| Call site | disclosed? |\n|---|---|\n|
          `IndexFile.remove()` \u2192 `git rm` | **yes, full file** |\n| `Head.checkout()`
          \u2192 `git checkout` | **yes, full file** |\n| `HEAD.reset()` \u2192 `git
          reset` | no - `git reset` does not error on unmatched pathspecs |\n| `IndexFile.move()`
          \u2192 `git mv` | no |\n\nThe two negatives are mentioned because \"the
          dismissal was wrong\" would overstate it: the\ndismissal was wrong for half
          of what it covered.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via
          Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython\n[GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython computes
          the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`)
          from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because
          that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a
          malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g.
          `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and
          initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside
          the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones
          the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization
          (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common
          and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack
          class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never
          adopted an equivalent check.\n\n##### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py`
          `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules`
          `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()`
          in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)`
          and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never
          used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()`
          then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join`
          does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this
          value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`,
          creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config)
          at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository
          the victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n##### PoC\n1. Environment:
          Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get
          install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory
          as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`,
          but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image).
          GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython`
          from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to
          the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration
          / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the
          attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules`
          + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3.
          Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's \"Confirmed test run\"
          section):\n```bash\n$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc
          .\n$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker
          run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`,
          then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source
          of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001
          PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent
          of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git\nrepository
          was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport shutil\n\nimport
          git\n\nCLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'\nESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'\n\ndef
          main():\n    shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)\n
          \   shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR),
          exist_ok=True)\n\n    print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')\n    repo
          = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)\n    print('Cloned
          into:', repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n    sms = list(repo.submodules)\n    for
          sm in sms:\n        print('  submodule name:', repr(sm.name))\n        print('
          \ submodule path:', repr(sm.path))\n\n    print('escape_target exists before
          update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    for sm in sms:\n        try:\n
          \           sm.update(init=True)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print('sm.update
          raised:', repr(e))\n\n    exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n    print('escape_target
          exists after update:', exists)\n    if exists:\n        print('escape_target
          contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE'
          if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    main()\n```\n5.
          Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's \"Confirmed
          test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC
          (vulnerable path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n
          \ submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'\n
          \ submodule path: 'legit_dir'\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target
          exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: ['modules_dir']\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n===
          Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious
          submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning:
          ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal:
          No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE
          (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the
          `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule
          \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]` (built
          by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The
          malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in
          the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the
          on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory.\n7. Expected
          vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI
          control run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule
          name\" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython
          instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git
          repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by
          `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8. Security
          impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation
          at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone
          directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's
          own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n##### Impact\nPath traversal (CWE-22)
          / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory
          and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity
          impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule
          URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only
          creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion
          potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control
          a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine,
          often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management
          tooling.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String:
          `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n#### References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses
          name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)\n[GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's config-name
          validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `\"option\"` label; it does
          not reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**.
          `write_section` writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so
          an option name such as `sshCommand = touch <cmd> #` is written as `\\tsshCommand
          = touch <cmd> # = <value>`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch
          <cmd>` (the trailing `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary
          config directives (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) \u2192
          RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not
          section name) and distinct character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket)
          from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w
          / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_assure_config_name_safe(name,
          label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY
          when `label == \"section\"`; for the `\"option\"` label it falls through
          with just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\\r\\n\\x00]` regex. `write_section`
          then writes the option name verbatim into `\"\\t%s = %s\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary git-config directive injection \u2192 remote code execution
          via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed)
          or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application
          to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control
          model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories
          GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nwith repo.config_writer() as cw:\n    cw.set_value(\"core\",
          \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")\n\n##### git config --get core.sshCommand
          \ ->  touch /tmp/RCE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls config
          writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand
          = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")`.\n2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option,
          \"option\")` @&#8203; config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\\r\\n\\x00]`;
          bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label==\"section\"`. Bypass proof:
          `=`,`#`,space pass \u2192 no `ValueError`.\n3. Sink: `write_section` writes
          `\"\\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n4. Impact:
          git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` \u2192 arbitrary code execution
          on next git op.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate
          harness): `set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x')` \u2192 no
          `ValueError`; file line `sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x`; `git config --get
          core.sshCommand` \u2192 `touch <RCE>` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath`
          via both `GitConfigParser` and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read:
          bracket/quote checks are inside `if label == \"section\"`; the `\"option\"`
          label is not covered.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57`
          (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested
          Fix\nApply the section-name safety checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`,
          whitespace) to the `\"option\"` label as well, or validate the fully-rendered
          config line after substitution.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014
          GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False
          short-option token smuggling enables command execution\n[GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nThe `check_unsafe_options`
          guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push,
          ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character
          kwarg with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list
          omits the smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>`
          argv token that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary
          command execution at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an
          incomplete-fix bypass of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3),
          which only emits value-derived candidates when `split_single_char_options`
          is True.\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_option_candidates` derives value-token candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` (cmd.py:1048,
          added by `e8d0fbf7`). With `split_single_char_options=False`, `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack\"})` returns only `['-n']` (not on
          the denylist), so the guard passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=False)`
          emits the JOINED token `-nutouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack` (cmd.py:1631). git
          clusters value-less short flags then parses `-u<cmd>` = `--upload-pack=<cmd>`
          \u2192 command execution. The hardened guard WOULD block the joined token
          if it saw it \u2014 the flaw is it never receives it.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
          OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) at default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`, affecting all guarded methods that forward
          kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards a user-controlled kwargs dict containing
          `split_single_char_options=False` plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding
          model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 accepts).\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom
          git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst,\n    n=\"utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\",\n
          \   split_single_char_options=False)   # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards user kwargs to `Repo.clone_from(url,
          path, **kwargs)`: `{split_single_char_options: False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}`.\n2.
          Check: `check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Guard: denylist includes `--upload-pack`/`-u`. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates`
          yields only `['-n']` (value token skipped because `split=False`); guard
          never sees `-u`.\n3. Sink: `transform_kwarg` emits joined token (cmd.py:1631).
          argv (observed): `['git','clone','-v','-nutouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>']`.\n4.
          Impact: git clusters `-n` + `-u<cmd>` \u2192 runs upload-pack command \u2192
          ACE.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness, default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`): the `split=False` payload created the marker
          `VH05_GATE_ACE` (ACE); the clone returned normally (guard bypassed). Control:
          `n='--upload-pack=\u2026'` (split default True) \u2192 `UnsafeOptionError:
          --upload-pack is not allowed`. Fix-commit read: `e8d0fbf7` extends candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` \u2014 split=False
          skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse fix (commit
          `56806080`) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives `['-n']`.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (code present verbatim on the latest
          release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` emit value-derived
          candidates regardless of `split_single_char_options` (i.e. also for the
          joined `-n<value>` form), OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed
          argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.58`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58):
          Security and Fixes\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58)\n\n#####
          What's Changed\n\n- test: allow Python startup before timeout by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2195](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2195)\n-
          Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2199](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2199)\n-
          Revert \"Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH\" by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2200](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2200)\n-
          test: focus pytest summary on unexpected failures by [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          Validate submodule names before filesystem operations by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          Handle invalid submodule names during recursive updates by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2205](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2205)\n-
          Fix Windows path handling on Python 3.13+ by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2196](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2196)\n-
          fixup 2202 by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2206](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2206)\n-
          Correct Windows hook Bash precedence by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2201](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2201)\n-
          Harden config and Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          Skip tests that need symlink privileges instead of erroring by [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529)
          in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n#####
          New Contributors\n\n- [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) made their
          first contribution in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMTIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsicmVub3ZhdGUiXX0=-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/293
        commit_id: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        patchset: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      change: '293'
      change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.58 [SECURITY]\n\nThis PR
        contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
        | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
        [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) |
        `==3.1.57` \u2192 `==3.1.58` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.58?slim=true)
        | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.57/3.1.58?slim=true)
        |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
        the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree
        enables arbitrary file overwrite\n[GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`,
        `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced
        treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard,
        no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree
        --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and
        last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method's
        internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index
        blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f)
        guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected
        (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep
        but was never reported or fixed).\n\n##### Root Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388),
        `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call
        `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`.
        The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
        file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content
        is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but
        the target path is fully attacker-controlled \u2014 corrupting/truncating
        configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H +
        A:H (per the skill's \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\" rule). Pure VALUE control
        (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo,
        \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n\n##### target overwritten with
        a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app
        calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)` / `merge_tree(base=\u2026,
        rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2.
        Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call
        `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014 no
        `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/\u2026/victim']`
        (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index
        blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently
        reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')`
        \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts
        `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob).
        `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit
        read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched
        on HEAD.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present
        verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
        guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`,
        and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block
        `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.\n\n---\nReported by
        **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score:
        8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary
        command execution via --template clone hooks\n[GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Repo.init()` forwards
        `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options`
        parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new
        repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook
        that executes on the next git operation \u2192 arbitrary code execution. `--template`
        is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`,
        and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct
        method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.\n\n#####
        Root Cause\n`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare
        `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options`
        and no `allow_unsafe_options`.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary code execution (hook
        fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions
        raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY
        control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known
        path \u2014 the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the
        clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init`
        has no guard at all.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker
        stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.init(path,
        template=\"/evil\")\n\n##### next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE\n```\n\n#####
        Attack Chain\n1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable)
        and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template='/evil')`.\n2. Check: NONE
        on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`.
        argv (observed): `['git','init','--template=/evil']`.\n3. Sink: git copies
        `/evil/hooks/post-commit` \u2192 `<repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit`.\n4. Impact:
        next commit runs the hook \u2192 arbitrary code execution.\n\n##### Bypass
        Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>')`
        \u2192 argv `['git','init','--template=<evil>']` unguarded; hook copied into
        `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker was created.
        `--separate-git-dir=<path>` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect vector through
        the same unguarded sink (value control only).\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython
        <= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present verbatim on the latest
        release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with
        an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting a denylist
        that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking / hook-installing
        options).\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove()
        and Head.checkout()\n[GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`IndexFile.remove()`
        and `Head.checkout()` forward `**kwargs` into `git rm` and `git checkout`\nwith
        no guard. Passing `--pathspec-from-file=<file>` **together with `--pathspec-file-nul`**\nmakes
        Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec\nerror
        quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through `GitCommandError.stderr`,
        so the\nentire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller
        in band.\n\nThis is the same primitive as Instance 2 of\n[GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f)
        - `TagReference.create()`\nwith `-F`, arbitrary file read returned in band
        - at two sites that advisory assessed and\ncleared.\n\n##### Prior art, and
        why I am filing rather than commenting\n\nGHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table
        lists these four sites with the assessment\n*\"`--pathspec-from-file` only
        reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found\"*:\n\n| Call site
        | git command | that advisory's assessment |\n|---|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.remove()`
        | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure
        primitive found |\n| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |\n| `HEAD.reset()`
        | `reset` | same |\n| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |\n\nThat assessment
        is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with\n`--pathspec-from-file`
        alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the **first\nline**,
        which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding `--pathspec-file-nul` - a
        sibling flag\nof the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing
        newlines - makes the\nwhole file one pathspec.\n\n##### Root cause\n\n`git/index/base.py:991-1043`:\n\n```python\ndef
        remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):\n    ...\n    removed_paths
        = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043\n```\n\n`git/refs/head.py:237-268`:\n\n```python\ndef
        checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):\n    ...\n    self.repo.git.checkout(self,
        **kwargs)                                 # line 268\n```\n\nNeither has an
        `allow_unsafe_options` parameter or a `check_unsafe_options()` call.\n\n#####
        Proof of concept\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import GitCommandError\n\nrepo
        = Repo(\"/path/to/repo\")\nkw = dict(pathspec_from_file=\"/etc/passwd\", pathspec_file_nul=True)\n\ntry:\n
        \   repo.index.remove([], **kw)          # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)\nexcept
        GitCommandError as e:\n    print(e.stderr)                      # <- entire
        file contents\n```\n\nObserved on published 3.1.57, against a canary file
        holding three marked lines:\n\n```\n[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm`
        returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n
        \      LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n       ' did not match any
        files'\n[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines
        in-band\n       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n       LINE2-SECRET-7777\n
        \      LINE3-TAIL-9999\n       ' did not match any file(s) known to git'\n[PASS]
        PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses\n[PASS]
        PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3\n```\n\nThe two precision
        controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the\ncanary
        being visible everywhere.\n\n##### Scope correction to the table above\n\nOf
        the four sites cleared with that sentence, **two disclose and two do not**:\n\n|
        Call site | disclosed? |\n|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.remove()` \u2192 `git rm`
        | **yes, full file** |\n| `Head.checkout()` \u2192 `git checkout` | **yes,
        full file** |\n| `HEAD.reset()` \u2192 `git reset` | no - `git reset` does
        not error on unmatched pathspecs |\n| `IndexFile.move()` \u2192 `git mv` |
        no |\n\nThe two negatives are mentioned because \"the dismissal was wrong\"
        would overstate it: the\ndismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via
        Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython\n[GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython computes the
        on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`)
        from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because
        that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious
        repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. `../../../../home/victim/.something`)
        and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen
        filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition
        is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule
        initialization (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a
        very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this
        exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation
        never adopted an equivalent check.\n\n##### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py`
        `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules`
        `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()`
        in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)`
        and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never
        used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()`
        then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join`
        does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this
        value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`,
        creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config)
        at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the
        victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n##### PoC\n1. Environment:
        Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get
        install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory
        as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`,
        but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image).
        GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython`
        from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to the
        officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration
        / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the
        attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules`
        + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3.
        Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's \"Confirmed test run\" section):\n```bash\n$
        docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .\n$ docker
        run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker run` executes
        `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`, then `poc_gitpython.py`,
        then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`),
        verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker
        repo and runs the equivalent of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython,
        then checks whether a git\nrepository was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport
        os\nimport shutil\n\nimport git\n\nCLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'\nESCAPE_TARGET
        = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'\n\ndef main():\n    shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR),
        ignore_errors=True)\n    shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n
        \   os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)\n\n    print(f'GitPython
        version: {git.__version__}')\n    repo = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo',
        CLONE_DIR)\n    print('Cloned into:', repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n    sms =
        list(repo.submodules)\n    for sm in sms:\n        print('  submodule name:',
        repr(sm.name))\n        print('  submodule path:', repr(sm.path))\n\n    print('escape_target
        exists before update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    for sm in sms:\n
        \       try:\n            sm.update(init=True)\n        except Exception as
        e:\n            print('sm.update raised:', repr(e))\n\n    exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n
        \   print('escape_target exists after update:', exists)\n    if exists:\n
        \       print('escape_target contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE'
        if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    main()\n```\n5.
        Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's \"Confirmed
        test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable
        path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n
        \ submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'\n
        \ submodule path: 'legit_dir'\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target
        exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: ['modules_dir']\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n===
        Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious
        submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning:
        ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal:
        No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE
        (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the `.gitmodules`
        section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]`
        (built by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`).
        The malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded
        in the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the
        on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory.\n7. Expected vs.
        observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI control
        run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule name\"
        and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created
        the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`,
        confirmed by `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8.
        Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository
        creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended
        clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the
        submodule's own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n##### Impact\nPath traversal
        (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory
        and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity
        impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL,
        much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation
        was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential).
        No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository
        the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic
        operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name
        validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)\n[GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's config-name
        validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `\"option\"` label; it does not
        reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**. `write_section`
        writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such
        as `sshCommand = touch <cmd> #` is written as `\\tsshCommand = touch <cmd>
        # = <value>`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch <cmd>` (the trailing
        `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives
        (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) \u2192 RCE on the next git
        operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct
        character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2
        (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67
        (newline injection).\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_assure_config_name_safe(name,
        label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY
        when `label == \"section\"`; for the `\"option\"` label it falls through with
        just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\\r\\n\\x00]` regex. `write_section` then
        writes the option name verbatim into `\"\\t%s = %s\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n\n#####
        Impact\nArbitrary git-config directive injection \u2192 remote code execution
        via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed)
        or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application
        to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control
        model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories
        GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.\n\n#####
        Proof of Concept\n```python\nwith repo.config_writer() as cw:\n    cw.set_value(\"core\",
        \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")\n\n##### git config --get core.sshCommand
        \ ->  touch /tmp/RCE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls config
        writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand
        = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")`.\n2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option,
        \"option\")` @&#8203; config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\\r\\n\\x00]`;
        bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label==\"section\"`. Bypass proof:
        `=`,`#`,space pass \u2192 no `ValueError`.\n3. Sink: `write_section` writes
        `\"\\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n4. Impact:
        git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` \u2192 arbitrary code execution
        on next git op.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness):
        `set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x')` \u2192 no `ValueError`;
        file line `sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x`; `git config --get core.sshCommand`
        \u2192 `touch <RCE>` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath` via both `GitConfigParser`
        and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside
        `if label == \"section\"`; the `\"option\"` label is not covered.\n\n#####
        Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (validator present verbatim on the
        latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nApply the section-name safety
        checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, whitespace) to the `\"option\"` label
        as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.\n\n---\nReported
        by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
        Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False
        short-option token smuggling enables command execution\n[GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nThe `check_unsafe_options`
        guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push,
        ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character kwarg
        with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list omits the
        smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>` argv token
        that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary command execution
        at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an incomplete-fix bypass
        of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3), which only emits value-derived
        candidates when `split_single_char_options` is True.\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_option_candidates`
        derives value-token candidates only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:`
        (cmd.py:1048, added by `e8d0fbf7`). With `split_single_char_options=False`,
        `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack\"})` returns
        only `['-n']` (not on the denylist), so the guard passes. But `transform_kwarg('n',
        value, split_single_char_options=False)` emits the JOINED token `-nutouch
        <cmd>;git-upload-pack` (cmd.py:1631). git clusters value-less short flags
        then parses `-u<cmd>` = `--upload-pack=<cmd>` \u2192 command execution. The
        hardened guard WOULD block the joined token if it saw it \u2014 the flaw is
        it never receives it.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the
        host process (via `--upload-pack`) at default `allow_unsafe_options=False`,
        affecting all guarded methods that forward kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards
        a user-controlled kwargs dict containing `split_single_char_options=False`
        plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3
        accepts).\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src,
        dst,\n    n=\"utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\",\n    split_single_char_options=False)
        \  # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards
        user kwargs to `Repo.clone_from(url, path, **kwargs)`: `{split_single_char_options:
        False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}`.\n2. Check: `check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([],
        kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Guard: denylist includes `--upload-pack`/`-u`.
        Bypass proof: `_option_candidates` yields only `['-n']` (value token skipped
        because `split=False`); guard never sees `-u`.\n3. Sink: `transform_kwarg`
        emits joined token (cmd.py:1631). argv (observed): `['git','clone','-v','-nutouch
        /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>']`.\n4. Impact: git clusters
        `-n` + `-u<cmd>` \u2192 runs upload-pack command \u2192 ACE.\n\n##### Bypass
        Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness, default `allow_unsafe_options=False`):
        the `split=False` payload created the marker `VH05_GATE_ACE` (ACE); the clone
        returned normally (guard bypassed). Control: `n='--upload-pack=\u2026'` (split
        default True) \u2192 `UnsafeOptionError: --upload-pack is not allowed`. Fix-commit
        read: `e8d0fbf7` extends candidates only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:`
        \u2014 split=False skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse
        fix (commit `56806080`) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives
        `['-n']`.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (code present
        verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates`
        emit value-derived candidates regardless of `split_single_char_options` (i.e.
        also for the joined `-n<value>` form), OR run `check_unsafe_options` over
        the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate
        list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
        [`v3.1.58`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58):
        Security and Fixes\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58)\n\n#####
        What's Changed\n\n- test: allow Python startup before timeout by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2195](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2195)\n-
        Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2199](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2199)\n-
        Revert \"Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH\" by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2200](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2200)\n-
        test: focus pytest summary on unexpected failures by [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
        in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
        Validate submodule names before filesystem operations by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
        Handle invalid submodule names during recursive updates by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2205](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2205)\n-
        Fix Windows path handling on Python 3.13+ by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2196](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2196)\n-
        fixup 2202 by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2206](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2206)\n-
        Correct Windows hook Bash precedence by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2201](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2201)\n-
        Harden config and Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
        Skip tests that need symlink privileges instead of erroring by [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529)
        in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n#####
        New Contributors\n\n- [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
        made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
        [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) made their
        first contribution in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n**Full
        Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
        At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
        defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
        manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
        conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
        Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
        - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
        box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
        View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMTIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsicmVub3ZhdGUiXX0=-->\n"
      change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/293
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      items:
      - branch: main
        change: '293'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.58 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.57` \u2192 `==3.1.58` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.58?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.57/3.1.58?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree
          enables arbitrary file overwrite\n[GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`IndexFile.from_tree`,
          `IndexFile.reset` (\u2192 from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced
          treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard,
          no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree
          --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path,
          and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the
          method's internal temp path \u2014 clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid
          git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251`
          (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree`
          was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites
          in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).\n\n##### Root
          Cause\n`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree),
          and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)`
          with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced
          and positional.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary file overwrite / destruction
          at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index
          blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled
          \u2014 corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen
          writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's \"overwrite-any-path = I:H\"
          rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nIndexFile.from_tree(repo, \"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\")\n\n#####
          target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=\u2026)`
          / `merge_tree(base=\u2026, rhs=\u2026)` with attacker `treeish=\"--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc\"`.\n2.
          Check: NONE \u2014 the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never
          call `check_unsafe_options`.\n3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` \u2014
          no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/\u2026/victim']`
          (last-wins).\n4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index
          blob; existing content destroyed.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently
          reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')`
          \u2192 victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts
          `DIRC\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x02\u2026` (destructive clobber, valid index blob).
          `reset(commit=\u2026)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit
          read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched
          on HEAD.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`,
          and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block
          `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.\n\n---\nReported by
          **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary
          command execution via --template clone hooks\n[GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Repo.init()` forwards
          `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options`
          parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new
          repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a
          hook that executes on the next git operation \u2192 arbitrary code execution.
          `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`,
          and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct
          method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare
          `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options`
          and no `allow_unsafe_options`.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary code execution
          (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions
          raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg
          (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at
          a known path \u2014 the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH
          for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because
          `Repo.init` has no guard at all.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n#####
          attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.init(path,
          template=\"/evil\")\n\n##### next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit ->
          ACE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit`
          (executable) and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template='/evil')`.\n2.
          Check: NONE on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`.
          argv (observed): `['git','init','--template=/evil']`.\n3. Sink: git copies
          `/evil/hooks/post-commit` \u2192 `<repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit`.\n4. Impact:
          next commit runs the hook \u2192 arbitrary code execution.\n\n##### Bypass
          Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>')`
          \u2192 argv `['git','init','--template=<evil>']` unguarded; hook copied
          into `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker
          was created. `--separate-git-dir=<path>` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect
          vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).\n\n##### Affected
          Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present
          verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd a `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting
          a denylist that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking
          / hook-installing options).\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub:
          @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector
          String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove()
          and Head.checkout()\n[GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\n`IndexFile.remove()`
          and `Head.checkout()` forward `**kwargs` into `git rm` and `git checkout`\nwith
          no guard. Passing `--pathspec-from-file=<file>` **together with `--pathspec-file-nul`**\nmakes
          Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec\nerror
          quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through `GitCommandError.stderr`,
          so the\nentire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller
          in band.\n\nThis is the same primitive as Instance 2 of\n[GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f)
          - `TagReference.create()`\nwith `-F`, arbitrary file read returned in band
          - at two sites that advisory assessed and\ncleared.\n\n##### Prior art,
          and why I am filing rather than commenting\n\nGHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep
          table lists these four sites with the assessment\n*\"`--pathspec-from-file`
          only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found\"*:\n\n| Call
          site | git command | that advisory's assessment |\n|---|---|---|\n| `IndexFile.remove()`
          | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure
          primitive found |\n| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |\n| `HEAD.reset()`
          | `reset` | same |\n| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |\n\nThat assessment
          is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with\n`--pathspec-from-file`
          alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the **first\nline**,
          which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding `--pathspec-file-nul` -
          a sibling flag\nof the same option, and the documented way to handle paths
          containing newlines - makes the\nwhole file one pathspec.\n\n##### Root
          cause\n\n`git/index/base.py:991-1043`:\n\n```python\ndef remove(self, items,
          working_tree=False, **kwargs):\n    ...\n    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args,
          paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043\n```\n\n`git/refs/head.py:237-268`:\n\n```python\ndef
          checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):\n    ...\n    self.repo.git.checkout(self,
          **kwargs)                                 # line 268\n```\n\nNeither has
          an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter or a `check_unsafe_options()` call.\n\n#####
          Proof of concept\n\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import
          GitCommandError\n\nrepo = Repo(\"/path/to/repo\")\nkw = dict(pathspec_from_file=\"/etc/passwd\",
          pathspec_file_nul=True)\n\ntry:\n    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          #
          or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)\nexcept GitCommandError as e:\n    print(e.stderr)
          \                     # <- entire file contents\n```\n\nObserved on published
          3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:\n\n```\n[PASS]
          IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr:
          'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n       LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n
          \      ' did not match any files'\n[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout`
          returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band\n       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242\n
          \      LINE2-SECRET-7777\n       LINE3-TAIL-9999\n       ' did not match
          any file(s) known to git'\n[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not
          every unguarded site discloses\n[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index
          leaks 0/3\n```\n\nThe two precision controls are there so the result is
          about these sinks and not about the\ncanary being visible everywhere.\n\n#####
          Scope correction to the table above\n\nOf the four sites cleared with that
          sentence, **two disclose and two do not**:\n\n| Call site | disclosed? |\n|---|---|\n|
          `IndexFile.remove()` \u2192 `git rm` | **yes, full file** |\n| `Head.checkout()`
          \u2192 `git checkout` | **yes, full file** |\n| `HEAD.reset()` \u2192 `git
          reset` | no - `git reset` does not error on unmatched pathspecs |\n| `IndexFile.move()`
          \u2192 `git mv` | no |\n\nThe two negatives are mentioned because \"the
          dismissal was wrong\" would overstate it: the\ndismissal was wrong for half
          of what it covered.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via
          Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython\n[GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython computes
          the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`)
          from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because
          that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a
          malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g.
          `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and
          initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside
          the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones
          the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization
          (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common
          and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack
          class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never
          adopted an equivalent check.\n\n##### Details\n`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py`
          `sm_name()` strips the `submodule \"` / `\"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules`
          `[submodule \"...\"]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()`
          in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)`
          and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never
          used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()`
          then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, \"modules\", name)` - `os.path.join`
          does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this
          value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`,
          creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config)
          at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository
          the victim clones and initializes submodules for.\n\n##### PoC\n1. Environment:
          Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get
          install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory
          as \"git 2.x\"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`,
          but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image).
          GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython`
          from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to
          the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.\n2. Configuration
          / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the
          attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules`
          + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).\n3.
          Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's \"Confirmed test run\"
          section):\n```bash\n$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc
          .\n$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc\n```\n(Per the Dockerfile, `docker
          run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`,
          then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)\n4. Full source
          of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:\n```python\n\"\"\"GHSA-001
          PoC: GitPython side.\n\nClones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent
          of\n`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git\nrepository
          was created outside the clone directory.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport shutil\n\nimport
          git\n\nCLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'\nESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'\n\ndef
          main():\n    shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)\n
          \   shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)\n    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR),
          exist_ok=True)\n\n    print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')\n    repo
          = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)\n    print('Cloned
          into:', repo.working_tree_dir)\n\n    sms = list(repo.submodules)\n    for
          sm in sms:\n        print('  submodule name:', repr(sm.name))\n        print('
          \ submodule path:', repr(sm.path))\n\n    print('escape_target exists before
          update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    for sm in sms:\n        try:\n
          \           sm.update(init=True)\n        except Exception as e:\n            print('sm.update
          raised:', repr(e))\n\n    exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)\n    print('escape_target
          exists after update:', exists)\n    if exists:\n        print('escape_target
          contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))\n\n    print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE'
          if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    main()\n```\n5.
          Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's \"Confirmed
          test run (Docker, released package)\" section):\n```\n=== GitPython PoC
          (vulnerable path) ===\nGitPython version: 3.1.57\nCloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo\n
          \ submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'\n
          \ submodule path: 'legit_dir'\nescape_target exists before update: False\nescape_target
          exists after update: True\nescape_target contents: ['modules_dir']\nPOC_RESULT=VULNERABLE\n\n===
          Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===\nwarning: ignoring suspicious
          submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nwarning:
          ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\nfatal:
          No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules\nCONTROL_RESULT=SAFE
          (real git correctly refused)\n```\n6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the
          `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule \"legit_dir\"]` to `[submodule
          \"../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir\"]` (built
          by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The
          malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in
          the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the
          on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory.\n7. Expected
          vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI
          control run) rejects the submodule name with \"ignoring suspicious submodule
          name\" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython
          instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git
          repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by
          `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.\n8. Security
          impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation
          at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone
          directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's
          own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.\n\n##### Impact\nPath traversal (CWE-22)
          / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory
          and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity
          impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule
          URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only
          creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion
          potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control
          a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine,
          often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management
          tooling.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String:
          `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n#### References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses
          name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)\n[GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's config-name
          validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `\"option\"` label; it does
          not reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**.
          `write_section` writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so
          an option name such as `sshCommand = touch <cmd> #` is written as `\\tsshCommand
          = touch <cmd> # = <value>`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch
          <cmd>` (the trailing `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary
          config directives (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) \u2192
          RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not
          section name) and distinct character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket)
          from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w
          / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_assure_config_name_safe(name,
          label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY
          when `label == \"section\"`; for the `\"option\"` label it falls through
          with just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\\r\\n\\x00]` regex. `write_section`
          then writes the option name verbatim into `\"\\t%s = %s\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary git-config directive injection \u2192 remote code execution
          via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed)
          or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application
          to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control
          model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories
          GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nwith repo.config_writer() as cw:\n    cw.set_value(\"core\",
          \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")\n\n##### git config --get core.sshCommand
          \ ->  touch /tmp/RCE\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls config
          writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand
          = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")`.\n2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option,
          \"option\")` @&#8203; config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\\r\\n\\x00]`;
          bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label==\"section\"`. Bypass proof:
          `=`,`#`,space pass \u2192 no `ValueError`.\n3. Sink: `write_section` writes
          `\"\\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n4. Impact:
          git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` \u2192 arbitrary code execution
          on next git op.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate
          harness): `set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x')` \u2192 no
          `ValueError`; file line `sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x`; `git config --get
          core.sshCommand` \u2192 `touch <RCE>` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath`
          via both `GitConfigParser` and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read:
          bracket/quote checks are inside `if label == \"section\"`; the `\"option\"`
          label is not covered.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57`
          (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n##### Suggested
          Fix\nApply the section-name safety checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`,
          whitespace) to the `\"option\"` label as well, or validate the fully-rendered
          config line after substitution.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014
          GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False
          short-option token smuggling enables command execution\n[GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nThe `check_unsafe_options`
          guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push,
          ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character
          kwarg with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list
          omits the smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>`
          argv token that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary
          command execution at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an
          incomplete-fix bypass of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3),
          which only emits value-derived candidates when `split_single_char_options`
          is True.\n\n##### Root Cause\n`_option_candidates` derives value-token candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` (cmd.py:1048,
          added by `e8d0fbf7`). With `split_single_char_options=False`, `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack\"})` returns only `['-n']` (not on
          the denylist), so the guard passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=False)`
          emits the JOINED token `-nutouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack` (cmd.py:1631). git
          clusters value-less short flags then parses `-u<cmd>` = `--upload-pack=<cmd>`
          \u2192 command execution. The hardened guard WOULD block the joined token
          if it saw it \u2014 the flaw is it never receives it.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
          OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) at default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`, affecting all guarded methods that forward
          kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards a user-controlled kwargs dict containing
          `split_single_char_options=False` plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding
          model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 accepts).\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom
          git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst,\n    n=\"utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\",\n
          \   split_single_char_options=False)   # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards user kwargs to `Repo.clone_from(url,
          path, **kwargs)`: `{split_single_char_options: False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}`.\n2.
          Check: `check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Guard: denylist includes `--upload-pack`/`-u`. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates`
          yields only `['-n']` (value token skipped because `split=False`); guard
          never sees `-u`.\n3. Sink: `transform_kwarg` emits joined token (cmd.py:1631).
          argv (observed): `['git','clone','-v','-nutouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>']`.\n4.
          Impact: git clusters `-n` + `-u<cmd>` \u2192 runs upload-pack command \u2192
          ACE.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness, default
          `allow_unsafe_options=False`): the `split=False` payload created the marker
          `VH05_GATE_ACE` (ACE); the clone returned normally (guard bypassed). Control:
          `n='--upload-pack=\u2026'` (split default True) \u2192 `UnsafeOptionError:
          --upload-pack is not allowed`. Fix-commit read: `e8d0fbf7` extends candidates
          only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` \u2014 split=False
          skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse fix (commit
          `56806080`) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives `['-n']`.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (code present verbatim on the latest
          release tag).\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` emit value-derived
          candidates regardless of `split_single_char_options` (i.e. also for the
          joined `-n<value>` form), OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed
          argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.58`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58):
          Security and Fixes\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58)\n\n#####
          What's Changed\n\n- test: allow Python startup before timeout by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2195](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2195)\n-
          Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2199](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2199)\n-
          Revert \"Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH\" by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2200](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2200)\n-
          test: focus pytest summary on unexpected failures by [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          Validate submodule names before filesystem operations by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)\n-
          Handle invalid submodule names during recursive updates by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2205](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2205)\n-
          Fix Windows path handling on Python 3.13+ by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2196](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2196)\n-
          fixup 2202 by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2206](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2206)\n-
          Correct Windows hook Bash precedence by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2201](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2201)\n-
          Harden config and Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)\n-
          Skip tests that need symlink privileges instead of erroring by [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529)
          in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n#####
          New Contributors\n\n- [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury)
          made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)\n-
          [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) made their
          first contribution in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMTIuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsicmVub3ZhdGUiXX0=-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/293
        commit_id: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        patchset: 916c14ee794a8c2453de3bc8d0a3293f7d9ae186
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
          src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      job: yamllint
      jobtags: []
      max_attempts: 3
      message: Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.58 [SECURITY]

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) | `==3.1.57` → `==3.1.58` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.58?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.57/3.1.58?slim=true) |

---

> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.

---

### GitPython: Unguarded git read-tree option forwarding in IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree enables arbitrary file overwrite
[GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
`IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed).

##### Root Cause
`from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional.

##### Impact
Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration.

##### Proof of Concept
```python
IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc")

##### target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...)
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=…)` / `merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)` with attacker `treeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc"`.
2. Check: NONE — the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`.
3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` — no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim']` (last-wins).
4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed.

##### Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')` → victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02…` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=…)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD.

##### Affected Versions
`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag).

##### Suggested Fix
Add a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/9b5dcaf85da5946dbf69dcd53f9edba08f760b32)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-4gmw-gg2m-w46p) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in Repo.init enables arbitrary command execution via --template clone hooks
[GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
`Repo.init()` forwards `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

##### Root Cause
`Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `allow_unsafe_options`.

##### Impact
Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init` has no guard at all.

##### Proof of Concept
```python

##### attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable)
from git import Repo
Repo.init(path, template="/evil")

##### next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable) and gets the app to call `Repo.init(path, template='/evil')`.
2. Check: NONE on `Repo.init`. Bypass proof: base.py:1435 is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)`. argv (observed): `['git','init','--template=/evil']`.
3. Sink: git copies `/evil/hooks/post-commit` → `<repo>/.git/hooks/post-commit`.
4. Impact: next commit runs the hook → arbitrary code execution.

##### Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): `Repo.init(dst, template='<evil>')` → argv `['git','init','--template=<evil>']` unguarded; hook copied into `.git/hooks/post-commit`; after `git commit` the `INIT_ACE` marker was created. `--separate-git-dir=<path>` is a parallel arbitrary-redirect vector through the same unguarded sink (value control only).

##### Affected Versions
`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (unguarded `git.init(**kwargs)` present verbatim on the latest release tag).

##### Suggested Fix
Add a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `Repo.init`, consulting a denylist that includes `--template` and `--separate-git-dir` (path-taking / hook-installing options).

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/d9ddb55bdc66)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-9rj7-rf2p-w77r) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Arbitrary file read via --pathspec-from-file in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout()
[GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary

`IndexFile.remove()` and `Head.checkout()` forward `**kwargs` into `git rm` and `git checkout`
with no guard. Passing `--pathspec-from-file=<file>` **together with `--pathspec-file-nul`**
makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec
error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through `GitCommandError.stderr`, so the
entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.

This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of
[GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) - `TagReference.create()`
with `-F`, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and
cleared.

##### Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting

GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment
*"`--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found"*:

| Call site | git command | that advisory's assessment |
|---|---|---|
| `IndexFile.remove()` | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |
| `HEAD.reset()` | `reset` | same |
| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |

That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with
`--pathspec-from-file` alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the **first
line**, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding `--pathspec-file-nul` - a sibling flag
of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the
whole file one pathspec.

##### Root cause

`git/index/base.py:991-1043`:

```python
def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
    ...
    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043
```

`git/refs/head.py:237-268`:

```python
def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
    ...
    self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs)                                 # line 268
```

Neither has an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter or a `check_unsafe_options()` call.

##### Proof of concept

```python
from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError

repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)

try:
    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
    print(e.stderr)                      # <- entire file contents
```

Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:

```
[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3
```

The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the
canary being visible everywhere.

##### Scope correction to the table above

Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, **two disclose and two do not**:

| Call site | disclosed? |
|---|---|
| `IndexFile.remove()` → `git rm` | **yes, full file** |
| `Head.checkout()` → `git checkout` | **yes, full file** |
| `HEAD.reset()` → `git reset` | no - `git reset` does not error on unmatched pathspecs |
| `IndexFile.move()` → `git mv` | no |

The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the
dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/f2550b65bf60ca087190981e2c7b6865e201f40c)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in GitPython
[GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`) from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check.

##### Details
`src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py` `sm_name()` strips the `submodule "` / `"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules` `[submodule "..."]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()` in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)` and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()` then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name)` - `os.path.join` does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for.

##### PoC
1. Environment: Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as "git 2.x"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython` from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`.
2. Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules` + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`).
3. Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's "Confirmed test run" section):
```bash
$ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc .
$ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc
```
(Per the Dockerfile, `docker run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`, then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.)
4. Full source of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim:
```python
"""GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side.

Clones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of
`git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git
repository was created outside the clone directory.
"""
import os
import shutil

import git

CLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo'
ESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root'

def main():
    shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True)
    shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True)
    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True)

    print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}')
    repo = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR)
    print('Cloned into:', repo.working_tree_dir)

    sms = list(repo.submodules)
    for sm in sms:
        print('  submodule name:', repr(sm.name))
        print('  submodule path:', repr(sm.path))

    print('escape_target exists before update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET))

    for sm in sms:
        try:
            sm.update(init=True)
        except Exception as e:
            print('sm.update raised:', repr(e))

    exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)
    print('escape_target exists after update:', exists)
    if exists:
        print('escape_target contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET))

    print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE' if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
```
5. Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's "Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)" section):
```
=== GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) ===
GitPython version: 3.1.57
Cloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo
  submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir'
  submodule path: 'legit_dir'
escape_target exists before update: False
escape_target exists after update: True
escape_target contents: ['modules_dir']
POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE

=== Control: real git CLI on identical repo ===
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
warning: ignoring suspicious submodule name: ../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir
fatal: No url found for submodule path 'legit_dir' in .gitmodules
CONTROL_RESULT=SAFE (real git correctly refused)
```
6. Payload: the attacker rewrites the `.gitmodules` section header from `[submodule "legit_dir"]` to `[submodule "../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir"]` (built by `build_attacker_repo.sh`, part of the harness in `GHSA/testing/`). The malicious part is the `../../../../../../` traversal sequence embedded in the submodule *name* (not the tree-validated `path`), which becomes the on-disk target for the submodule's separate git directory.
7. Expected vs. observed: A safe implementation (as demonstrated by the real `git` CLI control run) rejects the submodule name with "ignoring suspicious submodule name" and refuses to create anything outside the repository. GitPython instead created the escape-target directory and a fully-initialized Git repository at `/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir`, confirmed by `escape_target exists after update: True` and its listed contents.
8. Security impact demonstrated: arbitrary filesystem directory and Git-repository creation at an attacker-chosen absolute path outside the victim's intended clone directory, populated with attacker-controlled content sourced from the submodule's own (also attacker-controlled) `url`.

##### Impact
Path traversal (CWE-22) / external control of file path (CWE-73) leading to arbitrary directory and Git-repository creation outside the intended clone directory. Integrity impact is High (attacker chooses destination path and, via the submodule URL, much of the written content); Confidentiality impact is None (only creation was demonstrated); Availability impact is Low-Medium (disk-exhaustion potential). No authentication is required; the attacker only needs to control a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for - a routine, often fully-automatic operation in CI pipelines, IDE integrations, and dependency-management tooling.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/4299c990e1ca21896f9485277caf7bb0ae5b404c)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e4b8e7d026ca6abb4cf604f8e77093432ce23c06)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)
[GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `"option"` label; it does not reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**. `write_section` writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as `sshCommand = touch <cmd> #` is written as `\tsshCommand = touch <cmd> # = <value>`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch <cmd>` (the trailing `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) → RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).

##### Root Cause
`_assure_config_name_safe(name, label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY when `label == "section"`; for the `"option"` label it falls through with just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\r\n\x00]` regex. `write_section` then writes the option name verbatim into `"\t%s = %s\n"` (config.py:702).

##### Impact
Arbitrary git-config directive injection → remote code execution via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed) or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.

##### Proof of Concept
```python
with repo.config_writer() as cw:
    cw.set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x")

##### git config --get core.sshCommand  ->  touch /tmp/RCE
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: app calls config writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x")`.
2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option, "option")` @&#8203; config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\r\n\x00]`; bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label=="section"`. Bypass proof: `=`,`#`,space pass → no `ValueError`.
3. Sink: `write_section` writes `"\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\n"` (config.py:702).
4. Impact: git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` → arbitrary code execution on next git op.

##### Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): `set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x')` → no `ValueError`; file line `sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x`; `git config --get core.sshCommand` → `touch <RCE>` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath` via both `GitConfigParser` and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside `if label == "section"`; the `"option"` label is not covered.

##### Affected Versions
`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).

##### Suggested Fix
Apply the section-name safety checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, whitespace) to the `"option"` label as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False short-option token smuggling enables command execution
[GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
The `check_unsafe_options` guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character kwarg with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list omits the smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>` argv token that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary command execution at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an incomplete-fix bypass of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3), which only emits value-derived candidates when `split_single_char_options` is True.

##### Root Cause
`_option_candidates` derives value-token candidates only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` (cmd.py:1048, added by `e8d0fbf7`). With `split_single_char_options=False`, `_option_candidates([], {"n":"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack"})` returns only `['-n']` (not on the denylist), so the guard passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=False)` emits the JOINED token `-nutouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack` (cmd.py:1631). git clusters value-less short flags then parses `-u<cmd>` = `--upload-pack=<cmd>` → command execution. The hardened guard WOULD block the joined token if it saw it — the flaw is it never receives it.

##### Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) at default `allow_unsafe_options=False`, affecting all guarded methods that forward kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards a user-controlled kwargs dict containing `split_single_char_options=False` plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 accepts).

##### Proof of Concept
```python
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst,
    n="utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack",
    split_single_char_options=False)   # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: app forwards user kwargs to `Repo.clone_from(url, path, **kwargs)`: `{split_single_char_options: False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}`.
2. Check: `check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Guard: denylist includes `--upload-pack`/`-u`. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates` yields only `['-n']` (value token skipped because `split=False`); guard never sees `-u`.
3. Sink: `transform_kwarg` emits joined token (cmd.py:1631). argv (observed): `['git','clone','-v','-nutouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>']`.
4. Impact: git clusters `-n` + `-u<cmd>` → runs upload-pack command → ACE.

##### Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness, default `allow_unsafe_options=False`): the `split=False` payload created the marker `VH05_GATE_ACE` (ACE); the clone returned normally (guard bypassed). Control: `n='--upload-pack=…'` (split default True) → `UnsafeOptionError: --upload-pack is not allowed`. Fix-commit read: `e8d0fbf7` extends candidates only under `if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options:` — split=False skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse fix (commit `56806080`) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives `['-n']`.

##### Affected Versions
`GitPython <= 3.1.57` (code present verbatim on the latest release tag).

##### Suggested Fix
Make `_option_candidates` emit value-derived candidates regardless of `split_single_char_options` (i.e. also for the joined `-n<value>` form), OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/96a888f4d782cb2f80452148e48e60ce4af6d541)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>

### [`v3.1.58`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58): Security and Fixes

[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58)

##### What's Changed

- test: allow Python startup before timeout by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2195](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2195)
- Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2199](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2199)
- Revert "Resolve Windows hook Bash through PATH" by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2200](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2200)
- test: focus pytest summary on unexpected failures by [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury) in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)
- Validate submodule names before filesystem operations by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2202](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2202)
- Handle invalid submodule names during recursive updates by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2205](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2205)
- Fix Windows path handling on Python 3.13+ by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2196](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2196)
- fixup 2202 by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2206](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2206)
- Correct Windows hook Bash precedence by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2201](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2201)
- Harden config and Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2204](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204)
- Skip tests that need symlink privileges instead of erroring by [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)

##### New Contributors

- [@&#8203;raisulchowdhury](https://redirect.github.com/raisulchowdhury) made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2203](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2203)
- [@&#8203;Cyrus580529](https://redirect.github.com/Cyrus580529) made their first contribution in [#&#8203;2197](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2197)

**Full Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.57...3.1.58>

</details>

---

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